Vanderbilt University Law School

Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

2021

A Regulatory Policy Strategy for Protecting Immigrant Workers
W. Kip Viscusi
N. Marquiss

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, Immigration Law Commons, and the Workers'
Compensation Law Commons

Recommended Citation
W. Kip Viscusi and N. Marquiss, A Regulatory Policy Strategy for Protecting Immigrant Workers, 51 Seton
Hall Law Review. 933 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/1240

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of
Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

DATE DOWNLOADED: Fri Nov 5 09:27:48 2021
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.
W. Kip Viscusi & Nick Marquiss, A Regulatory Policy Strategy for Protecting Immigrant
Workers, 51 Seton HALL L. REV. 933 (2021).
ALWD 6th ed.
Viscusi, W.; Marquiss, N. ., A regulatory policy strategy for protecting immigrant
workers, 51(4) Seton Hall L. Rev. 933 (2021).
APA 7th ed.
Viscusi, W., & Marquiss, N. (2021). regulatory policy strategy for protecting
immigrant workers. Seton Hall Law Review, 51(4), 933-982.
Chicago 17th ed.
W. Kip Viscusi; Nick Marquiss, "A Regulatory Policy Strategy for Protecting Immigrant
Workers," Seton Hall Law Review 51, no. 4 (2021): 933-982
McGill Guide 9th ed.
W Kip Viscusi & Nick Marquiss, "A Regulatory Policy Strategy for Protecting Immigrant
Workers" (2021) 51:4 Seton Hall L Rev 933.
AGLC 4th ed.
W Kip Viscusi and Nick Marquiss, 'A Regulatory Policy Strategy for Protecting
Immigrant Workers' (2021) 51(4) Seton Hall Law Review 933.
MLA 8th ed.
Viscusi, W. Kip, and Nick Marquiss. "A Regulatory Policy Strategy for Protecting
Immigrant Workers." Seton Hall Law Review, vol. 51, no. 4, 2021, p. 933-982.
HeinOnline.
OSCOLA 4th ed.
W Kip Viscusi and Nick Marquiss, 'A Regulatory Policy Strategy for Protecting
Immigrant Workers' (2021) 51 Seton Hall L Rev 933
Provided by:
Vanderbilt University Law School
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and
Conditions of the license agreement available at
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use:
Copyright Information

A Regulatory Policy Strategy for Protecting
Immigrant Workers
W. Kip Viscusi" & Nick Marquiss***
Immigration has become a focal point of many political campaigns,
most notably that of PresidentTrump in 2016 and againin 2020. Populist
rhetoric also decries immigrant workers for taking Americans'jobs and
depressing wages for U.S.-born workers.
Yet immigrants serve a
constructive role by working in some of the most dangerous occupations
in the country. It is well-known that immigrant workers, particularly
those from Mexico with limited English language skills, face a higher
workplacefatality rate than native workers. Efforts to reverse this trend
have long been the focus of the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), which undertook numerous policy initiatives
under the Bush and Obama Administrations to reduce immigrant
fatalitiesin the workplace.
Using three different datasets, this Article empirically shows that,
while job safety has improved for immigrant workers, more gains are
required to reduce immigrantfatality rates to align with those of native
workers. In reaching this result, we make several contributions to the
literature. First,we use recent datafrom the Census ofFatalOccupational
Injuries (CFOI) to show that immigrants, particularlythose from Mexico,
experienced higherfatality ratesthan native-born workers in 2003, 2007,
and 2015. Second, we empirically demonstrate that a large group of
recent immigrants to the United States, as reportedin the New Immigrant
Survey, either remain in high-riskjobs or increase theirfatality risks over
time. In doing so, we are the first researchersto exploit the longitudinal
nature of the New Immigrant Survey to assess whether immigrant
workers progressed into safer jobs between 2003 and 2007. Finally, we

'This paper used fatal injury data that were obtained with restricted access to the
Bureau of Labor Statistics' (BLS) Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI) Research
File.
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provide updated estimates of the Value of Statistical Life for immigrant
workers using recentfatalitydatafrom the 2015 CFOI. Here, we show that
unlike native-born workers, immigrant workers-especially those from
Mexico-are not only in higher-riskjobs but also not compensated with
hazardpay for workplacefatality risks.
In conjunction, these results show that, while OSHA's outreach
programs toward immigrants have served a constructive function, more
can be done to communicatejob risks to immigrantworkers to help them
progressinto saferjobs. In particular,since immigrant workers who lack
English proficiency suffer most in the labor market, we recommend that
OSHA target its outreach programs toward providing safety materials in
an immigrant worker's native language to alert workers to the hazards
that are present and to promote safety training that immigrant workers
can understand. Additionally, we also suggest that OSHA conduct a
benefit-cost analysis to assess alternative regulatory policies that
mandate employers to provide safety and training materials in other
languages, such as Spanish.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Immigration has become a focal point of many political campaigns,
most notably that of President Trump in 2016 and again in 2020.1 In
addition, populist rhetoric decries immigrants for "taking American
jobs" and depressing wages for U.S.-born workers.2 Yet, despite these
notions, it is also the case that immigrants serve a constructive function
for the U.S. economy through their work in some of the most dangerous
occupations in the country. In 2018, immigrants disproportionately
worked in the farming, fishing, forestry, and construction occupations
relative to U.S.-born workers,3 which are among the country's most
dangerous occupations. 4 On average, immigrant workers, particularly
those from Mexico, also have a higher workplace fatality rate than
native-born workers.5
The fact that immigrants face higher workplace mortality risks has
not gone unnoticed by academics or policymakers. The Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), which is tasked with
protecting both U.S.-born and immigrant workers in their workplaces,
has engaged in many outreach or educational programs to reduce

1 Making America
Great Again: Immigration | President Donald Trump
Accomplishments, PROMISES MADE, PROMISES KEPT!, https://www.promiseskeptcom/

achievement/overview/immigration [https://web.archive.org/web/202001020426

09/https://www.promiseskept.com/achievement/overview/immigration/]

(last

visited Jan. 2, 2020); Daniel Bush, Where President Trump Stands on the Issues in 2020,

PBS NEws HOUR (June 19, 2019, 5:16 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/
where-president-trump-stands-on-the-issues-in-2020 (last visited Jan. 16, 2020).
2 Josh Boak, AP Fact Check: Trump Plays on Immigration Myths, PBS NEws HOUR (Feb.
8, 2019, 10:44 AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/ap-fact-check-trump-

plays-on-immigration-myths (quoting President Trump as saying, "[w]orking-class
Americans are left to pay the price for mass illegal immigration: reduced jobs, lower
wages, overburdened schools, hospitals that are so crowded you can't get in, increased
crime, and a depleted social safety net").

s Census of Fatal Occupation Injuries (CFO)--Current and Revised Data, U.S. BUREAU
STATISTICS, https://www.bls.gov/iif/oshcfoil.htm#rates
(last visited Jan. 15,
2020).
a Id.

OF LABOR

s See generally Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Immigrant Status and the Value of
Statistical Life, 45 J. HUMAN RES. 749 (2010).
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immigrant fatalities on the job site.6 Likewise, many academics have
demonstrated empirically that immigrants on average experience a
higher workplace fatality rate than U.S.-born workers and, more
concerning, that some groups of immigrants receive little or no
compensation for these job risks. In light of OSHA's efforts to address
immigrant fatalities along with the academic research showing that
immigrants fare poorly in the workplace, this Article offers an updated
picture of workplace fatality risks for immigrants. In doing so, this
Article provides new empirical evidence that immigrants experience
higher average fatality risks than U.S.-born workers, that many
immigrants fail to progress into safer jobs over time, and that immigrant
workers, especially those from Mexico, are not compensated through
hazard pay for their job risks. This Article, therefore, serves not only as
an update to results in the economics literature but also provides insight
into the effectiveness of OSHA's efforts to reduce immigrant fatalities.
In addition, this Article is the first to demonstrate that many immigrants
fail to transition to safer jobs over time using data from the New
Immigrant Survey (NIS).
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides contextual
demographic information about the immigrant population in the United
immigrants
that
showing
by
concluding
before
States
disproportionately work in the most dangerous occupations in the
United States.
Part III shows that immigrants experience higher average fatality
rates than U.S.-born workers and that many immigrants remain locked
into high-risk jobs over time. To conduct this analysis, we first explain
our procedure for the construction of fatality rates using the CFOI
dataset in Section III.A. We then apply the fatality rates in Section III.B
to data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) to show that
immigrants bear a disproportionate share of workplace fatalities and
have a higher average fatality rate than U.S.-born workers. Finally,
Section III.C concludes by using data from the NIS to empirically
demonstrate that a substantial portion of new immigrants in the United
States remained in high-risk jobs between the two waves of the NIS.
6 See infra Section VI.A
7 Christen G. Byler, Hispanic/LatinoFatal OccupationalInjury Rates, MONTHLY LAB.
REV., Feb. 2013 at 14; Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 5, at 749; Pia M. Orrenius & Madeline
Zavodny, Do Immigrants Work in Riskier Jobs?, 46 DEMOGRAPHY 535 (2009); Scott
Richardson, et al., Appendix D: Hispanic Workers in the United States: An Analysis of
Employment Distributions, Fatal Occupational Injuries, and Non-Fatal Occupational
Injuries and Illnesses, in SAFETY ISSEGURIDAD: A WORKSHOP SUMMARY 43, 43 (Nat'l Rsch.
Council, 2003); Katherine Loh &Scott Richardson, Foreign-BornWorkers: Trends in Fatal
OccupationalInjuries, 1996-2001, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Oct. 2005, at 42, 42.
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Of course, showing that immigrants experience a higher average
fatality risk than native-born workers or remain locked into high-risk
jobs is only part of the story, since it may be the case that immigrants
simply prefer high-risk jobs.
We must therefore ask whether
immigrants receive wage compensation in return for their aboveaverage job risks. Before answering this question empirically, we first
describe in Part IV how it is theoretically possible for immigrants and
native workers to be paid differently for job risks for the same job. In
short, we explain that immigrants and U.S.-born workers can receive
different wage compensation for job risks if the labor market is
segregated so that immigrants face a different set of job options than do
non-immigrants.8 Put another way, the available wage rate offered in
the market for any given level of risk differs for native and immigrant
workers. Accordingly, immigrant workers may select a high-risk job
from the options available to them, but they may not receive the same
level of wage compensation for these risks that other workers who face
a different wage-offer curve receive. Part IV also provides background
information on the Value of a Statistical Life (VSL), which quantifies the
benefit of avoiding a fatality, for our VSL estimations in Part V.
Part V provides our primary results. This Part first outlines the
data and methodology used to show that immigrants do not receive
hazard pay and describes other results in the literature that also
illustrate that immigrants are not compensated for job risks. This Part
then provides our empirical estimates and reports our primary result
that immigrant workers, particularly those from Mexico, fail to receive
hazard pay for their fatality risks. We show that in 2015 this failure, on
average, cost immigrants over $500 in lost annual wages and that
Mexican immigrants were underpaid by nearly $1,000 annually because
they did not receive compensation for job risks.9 The results in this Part,
in conjunction with those developed in Part III, complete the picture of
immigrants in the workforce: immigrants face a higher average fatality
rate than native workers, remain locked into high-risk jobs over time,
and, in the case of Mexican immigrants, do not receive adequate wage
compensation for their fatality risk.
Part VI outlines our policy recommendations that OSHA can
undertake to reduce immigrant fatalities.
This Part begins by
summarizing OSHA's policies toward the immigrant-worker population
in the United States. In particular, Section VI.A documents that OSHA's
interest in improving immigrant workers' welfare in the labor force

8 Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 5, at 752.
9 See infra Section V.D.
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dates back to the George W. Bush administration,1 0 grew under the
Barack Obama administration, 1 ' and continued, though perhaps with
less force, under the Donald Trump administration.1 2 Part VI next
discusses our results in light of OSHA's policies to reduce immigrant
workplace fatalities and makes several policy recommendations
regarding how OSHA can increase immigrant-worker safety.
Overall, the results developed in this Article show that OSHA could
have done more to improve immigrant welfare in the workplace under
the Bush and Obama Administrations.1 3 First, immigrant fatality rates
were roughly the same in 2003 and 2007-a period that spans OSHA's
outreach programs under the Bush Administration. To be sure, OSHA's
policies at this time may have prevented immigrant fatality rates from
being higher than they would have been absent OSHA's efforts.
Nevertheless, immigrant workers failed to improve relative to U.S.-born
workers-as evidenced by the fact that both immigrant-worker fatality
rates and U.S.-born-worker fatality rates were constant. This persistent
fatality rate gap creates potential opportunities for government policies
to improve workplace safety for immigrant workers to be comparable
to that of native American workers.
In addition to the lack of progress in immigrant safety at the
economy-wide level, individual workers also failed to progress into
safer jobs over time. We show that from 2003 to 2007 immigrants
remained locked into high-risk jobs and immigrant workers, especially
Mexican immigrants, did not receive hazard pay for their higher job
risks. Under the Bush Administration, OSHA engaged in several
community outreach programs to improve immigrant welfare,
including the creation of a national clearinghouse for training programs
in Spanish, a Spanish-language website for employees and employers,
the establishment of an 800 number for Spanish-speaking workers, and

&

10 See, e.g., John L. Henshaw, Assistant Sec'y of Lab, Dep't of Lab., Statement before
the Subcommittee on Employment, Safety and Training (Feb. 27, 2002),
https://www.osha.gov/news/testimonies/02272002 (explaining the creation of the
Hispanic Worker's Task Force).
11 Press Release, Dep't of Lab., National Action Summit for Latino Worker Health
Safety (Apr. 14-15, 2010), https://www.osha.gov/archive/latinosummit/index.html
(outlining the creation of a summit to discuss Latino worker safety).
12 See, e.g., Training Resources in Spanish Language, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
ADMIN., https://www.osha.gov/dte/outreach/constructiongeneralindustry/spanish_
training.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2020) (providing training resources for Spanishspeaking workers); Annual Alliance Report, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN.,
https://www.osha.gov/alliances/regional/region6/alliance-annual-report_20190726
(last visited Jan. 13, 2020) (outlining OSHA's outreach programs in Texas under the
Trump Administration).
13

We narrow our focus to the Bush and Obama Administrations, rather than the

Trump Administration as well, because our data only span these two administrations.
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several local outreach programs to distribute safety materials in
Spanish. Though these programs appear to be constructive efforts that
are well-suited to addressing the obstacles posed by language barriers,
more vigorous and effective efforts are needed.
In addition, our results also suggest that, while OSHA's outreach
efforts under the Obama Administration seemed to be well-suited to
enhancing immigrant workers' welfare, they were inadequate by
themselves to eliminate the labor market challenges facing immigrant
workers. Notably, in 2010, OSHA organized a national summit with over
five hundred attendees-such as labor union members and community
leaders-to address immigrant fatalities, particularly in the Latino
community. Follow-up summits held across the country emerged after
the national summit to develop ways to provide immigrant workers
with education, training, and assistance. Conferences such as these
provide an alert regarding immigrants' higher job risks, but they were
ultimately insufficient to improve immigrant outcomes nationwide. We
show that immigrant workers still suffered in the labor market relative
to native workers between 2007 and 2015. For instance, Section III.B
shows that the fatality rate for immigrants was higher than U.S.-born
workers in 2007 and 2015, and Section V.D shows that immigrants,
especially those from Mexico, did not receive hazard pay for bearing
these risks during this time. Again, it may be the case that but for OSHA's
policies, the picture for immigrants could be even bleaker than it already
Even so, our data does not show that the safety and risk
is.
compensation of immigrant workers improved relative to native
workers: U.S.-born workers had a lower fatality rate than immigrants
and, unlike immigrants, received hazard pay for job risks in 2007 and
2015, suggesting that immigrants did not improve relative to U.S.-born
workers.
OSHA engaged in many outreach efforts toward immigrant
workers under both the Bush and Obama Administrations, such as the
creation of the Hispanic Worker's Task Force in 2002 and the National
Action Summit for Latino Worker Health & Safety in 2010. While these
programs seem quite appropriate, we think that the continued
immigrant-native worker gap in labor market outcomes with respect to
risk levels and risk compensation creates opportunities to narrow this
gap. Based on prior research showing that immigrants not fluent in
English suffer relative to immigrants more adept in English,1 4 we make
a modest recommendation that, so long as the programs' benefits
exceed their costs, OSHA engage in more targeted programs aimed at

14 Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 5, at 768.
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delivering safety materials to immigrant workers in their native
language. Focusing on Spanish-speaking immigrant workers is an ideal
starting point, given that Mexican workers face the highest fatality risk
levels and receive no corresponding compensation in wages. Through
initiatives like this, OSHA can educate immigrant workers that lack
English skills about the job risks that they face in their workplaces and
the precautions that they might take to reduce these risks. This could
then encourage immigrant workers to transition into safer jobs-or at
least jobs that will compensate them for their fatality risks.
We also recommend that, subject to a benefit-cost test, OSHA take
a more aggressive stance and promulgate regulations mandating that
employers provide safety and training materials in a language that their
workers can understand. Currently, OSHA has dozens of regulations
designed to convey job risks to workers through safety data sheets,
training manuals, and labels across all major industries. Many of these
regulations, however, do not require this training to occur in any
language other than English. 15 Because these training materials
potentially serve as a mechanism for informing immigrant workers, we
recommend that OSHA mandate that employers translate safety
materials into an immigrant worker's native language. Because there
are multiple training and risk communication efforts that are possible,
where these vary in their stringency and their cost, we recommend that
OSHA adopt the approach that has the greatest net benefits to society,
i.e., benefits less costs. In recognition that most immigrant workers in
dangerous occupations speak Spanish, we recommend that OSHA
initiate pilot programs with requirements that training materials be
translated into Spanish, since these regulations will likely pass a costbenefit test. Next, we suggest that OSHA investigate the costs and
benefits of expanding language requirements to include translations
into languages beyond English and Spanish. For occupations that
employ many immigrants that do not speak Spanish or English, it may
be socially optimal for OSHA to require safety materials to be translated
into a language that that particular group of immigrants understands.
In safety-training situations in which training is communicated verbally
to workers, OSHA should require that safety procedures be
communicated in a language that the workers can read or speak.

is See infra Section VIA.
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II. BACKGROUND
Before deriving the empirical results reached in this Article, this
Part offers a broad summary of the demographic characteristics of
immigrants in the United States along with an overview of the types of
occupations that employ immigrants. Section A provides an overview
of the average demographic characteristics of immigrants in the United
States and Section B describes the types of jobs in which immigrants
work.
A. BroadSummary of Immigrant Characteristics
This Section provides a broad overview of demographic
characteristics of the immigrant population in the United States in order
to contextualize this Article's findings with the immigrant population,
generally.
In 2017, more than 44.5 million immigrants resided in the United
States.' 6 Since the year 2000, immigrants have composed between 11
and 14 percent of the population of the United States.1 7 Furthermore,
immigration is on the rise. After a low in the 1970s, immigration has
again approached historical levels, and the immigrant share of the
population has reached highs not seen since before World War I.18
Immigrants also composed about 17 percent of the labor force in 2019.19
Education attainment among immigrants is similar to that of
United States natives. In 2016, approximately 32 percent of immigrants
age twenty-five or older had a bachelor's degree or higher relative to 34
percent of U.S.-born adults. 20 At the opposite end of the spectrum,
immigrants were much more likely than U.S.-born adults to have less
than a ninth-grade education. Over 16 percent of immigrants had less
than a ninth-grade education, compared with 1.9 percent of the nativeborn population. 21 The median age for the immigrant population in
2018 was greater than that of the U.S.-born population, with a median

16 U.S. Immigrant Population and Share over Time, 1850-Present, MIGRATION POLICY
INST., https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/immigrant-

population-over-time (last visited Jan. 13, 2020).
17 Id.
18

Id.

Press Release, U.S. Bureau of Lab. Stat, Foreign-Born Workers: Labor Force
Characteristics-2019 (May 15, 2020), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/
forbrn.pdf.
20 Christine Gambino, Random Samplings: Immigrant Families and Educational
Attainment, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.census.gov/
19

newsroom/blogs/random-samplings/2017/03/immigrant_familiesa.html.
21 Id.
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22
age of 45.2 years for immigrants compared to 36.3 years for natives.
Women comprised about 52 percent of the immigrant population in
201823 compared with about 51.1 percent of the native-born
population. 24 Unsurprisingly, immigrant populations are frequently of
limited English proficiency; approximately 47 percent of immigrants
over age five were of limited English proficiency.2 s
Turning next to national origin, Mexican immigrants compose the
largest group of immigrants in the United States by a large margin.
Approximately one in four immigrants in the United States are from
Mexico. 26 For comparison, Indians and Chinese were among the next
two largest immigrant groups, comprising approximately 6 and 5
7
percent of the immigrant population, respectively.2 Forty-four percent
28
of U.S. immigrants reported having Hispanic or Latino origins.
It is worthwhile to briefly narrow in on Mexican immigrants, since
29
they bear a significant portion of workplace fatalities. Note that these
statistics are for all Mexican immigrants regardless of documentation
status. Mexican immigrants ages twenty-five and older have much
lower educational attainment than either the native-born population or
other non-Mexican immigrant populations.3 0 In 2019, roughly 53
percent of Mexican immigrants lacked a high school diploma, compared
to 26 percent of non-Mexican immigrants and 8 percent of the U.S.-born
population.3 1 Fewer than 8 percent of Mexican immigrants had a
bachelor's degree or higher.3 2 Overall, immigrants from Mexico are
slightly younger than all immigrants but older than the U.S.-born

22 Jeanne Batalova et al., Frequently Requested Statistics on Immigrants and
Immigration in the United States, MIGRATION PoLICY INST. (Feb. 14, 2020),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frequently-requested-statistics-immigrantsand-immigration-united-states.
23 AM. IMMIGRANT COUNCIL, IMMIGRANT WOMEN AND GIRLS IN THE UNITED STATES: A PORTRAIT
OF DEMOGRAPHIC DIVERSITY (2020), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/siteS/

default/files/research/immigrantwomen_in_the_united_states.pdf.
24 Kaiser Family Foundation, Population Distribution by Sex, https://www.kff.org/
7
other/state-indicator/distribution-by-sex/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=% B%
22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D (last visited February 9,
2020).
2s Emma Israel & Jeanne Batalova, Mexican Immigrants in the United States,
MIGRATION PoLICY INST. (Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/
mexican-immigrants-united-states#AgeEducationEmployment.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29

30
31

See generally Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 5.
Israel & Batalova, supra note 25.
Id.

32 Id.
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population. 33 Finally, the Mexican immigrant population is less likely to
be proficient in English than the overall foreign-born population. 34
Sixty-six percent of Mexican immigrants reported limited English
proficiency in 2019 relative to 46 percent of all immigrants. 3s
B. ImmigrantDistributionin the Labor Force
Because this Article focuses on immigrants in the workplace, this
Section provides a broad overview of where immigrants work in the
American economy. In 2019, there were over twenty-eight million
foreign-born workers in the U.S. labor force, about 17 percent of the
total labor force. 36 Moreover, immigrants disproportionately work in
some of America's most dangerous jobs. According to the most recent
2019 statistics from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1.7 percent of
immigrants work in farming, fishing, and forestry occupations
compared to just 0.5 percent of the native population. 37 In particular,
immigrant workers dominated the construction occupation. Nearly 10
percent of the immigrant population work in construction while only 4.5
percent of the native population work in this occupation. 38 The
construction occupation is among the most dangerous in the country,
with a fatality rate of 12.9 deaths per 100,000 workers. 39
In contrast, immigrants are also disproportionately less likely to
work in safer occupations. Though 18 percent of native-born workers
are employed in the management occupations, only 13.1 percent of
immigrants work in these types of jobs. 40 Similarly, the professional
occupations-such as computer engineering, education, and lawemploy fewer immigrants than native workers. Overall, 20.8 percent of
immigrants were employed in these occupations compared to 24.2
percent of natives. 41 Importantly, these occupations are among the
safest. The fatality rate for the management occupations is 1.5 deaths

33 Id. (Mexican immigrants were forty-five years old on average, compared to fortysix years for all immigrants and thirty-seven years for U.S.-born population).
34 Id.
3s

Id.

36

U.S. Bureau of Lab. Stat., supra note 19.

37 I.
38 Id.

39 U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., CENSUS OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES (CFOI)--CURRENT,
https://www.bls.gov/iif/oshcfoil.htm#rates (last visited Jan. 13, 2021) (available as a
downloadable spreadsheet titled Hours-based fatal injury rates by industry, occupation,

and selected demographic characteristics, 2019, Census of Fatal Occupation Injuries-Current and Revised Data).
40 U.S. Bureau of Lab. Stat., supra note 19.
41 Id.
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per 100,000 workers, while the fatality rate for the professional
occupations is 0.7 deaths.42
The economics and policy literatures also find that immigrants,
particularly Hispanic immigrants, work in the most dangerous
occupations. Among the first to study this issue, Richardson, Ruser, and
Saurez (2003)43 and Loh and Richardson (2004)44 both found that
Hispanic workers have a higher fatality risk than the average worker.
Orrenius and Zavodny (2009) found that immigrants, compared to
native U.S. workers, work in riskier jobs. 45 In a methodology akin to that
used in this Article, Hersch and Viscusi (2010) showed that immigrants
overall have a higher fatality rate than native U.S. workers and that this
difference is driven by Mexican immigrants. 46 They also showed that
non-Mexican immigrants face a lower fatality rate than native U.S.
workers.4 7 Finally, the most recent work in this area is a study published
in the Monthly Labor Review by Byler (2013), which found that
Hispanic/Latino workers have a higher overall occupational fatality rate
than that of all workers and that foreign-born Hispanic/Latino workers
experience higher injury rates than native-born Hispanic/Latino
48
workers in certain occupations, such as sales or protective services.
Overall, immigrants compose a disproportionate share of the
dangerous occupations than U.S.-born workers. Many OSHA policiesincluding those dedicated toward helping immigrants 49-are designed
to improve safety in these dangerous industries. Accordingly, the
remainder of this Article will address how immigrants fare in the
workplace, with particular attention given to the traditional blue-collar
50
occupations that have the highest fatality rates.

42

U.S. BUREAU

OF LAB. STAT.,

supra note 39.

43 Richardson et al. supra note 7, at 43.
44 Loh & Richardson, supra note 7, at 42.

4s Orrenius & Zavodny, supra note 7, at 535.
46 Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 5, at 758.
47 Id.
48 Byler, supra note 7, at 14.
49 See infra Section VI.A; see also supra note 10 and surrounding text.
so The nine occupations that we designate as blue-collar occupations are: (i)
healthcare practitioner and technical occupations, and healthcare support occupations;
(ii) protective service occupations; (iii) food preparation and serving related
occupations; (iv) building and grounds cleaning and maintenance occupations; (v)
personal care and service occupations; (vi) farming, fishery, and forestry, and
construction and extraction occupations; (vii) installation, maintenance, and repair

occupations; (viii) production occupations; and (ix) transportation and material moving
occupations.
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III. COMPARING RISK LEVELS FOR IMMIGRANTS AND NATIVE WORKERS

Previous research indicates that immigrants work in riskier jobs
than U.S.-born workers, as measured by the average workplace fatality
rates for these two groups. This Part updates that research using the
newest data available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and shows
that immigrants still have an average workplace fatality rate higher than
native workers. In addition, this Part also shows that immigrants
remain locked into high-risk jobs over time using data from the NIS, a
panel dataset that collected demographic, job, and other information on
8,573 new immigrants in 2003 and 2007. This Article is the first to use
the NIS to assess how immigrants are progressing over time with
respect to the riskiness of their employment. Section A of this Part
describes our methodology for constructing fatality rates for three
different risk measures. Section B uses these fatality rates to compare
immigrant and U.S.-born risk levels. Finally, Section C shows that a
substantial portion of immigrants in the NIS remained in high-risk jobs
between 2003 and 2007.
A. Construction of FatalityRates
This Section explains our methodology for constructing the fatality
rates used in Sections III.B, III.C, and V.D of this Article. We follow the
latest methodology used in the economics literature, which is also
consistent with the general procedure used by the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, to create hours-based fatality rates. 5 ' A fatality rate measures
the number of deaths per 100,000 workers. For instance, a fatality rate
of 4.0 would mean that four workers died for every 100,000 workers.
The source of our fatality information is the Bureau of Labor
Statistics' CFOI. The CFOI is a comprehensive census of all job-related
fatalities in which each fatality is verified with multiple sources,
including a worker's death certificate and worker's compensation
record.5 2 The CFOI captures every fatality in the workplace and is
widely accepted as the best data source for worker fatalities.s 3 In
addition to information on the worker's age, industry, and occupation,

s1 Elissa Philip Gentry & W. Kip Viscusi, The Fatality and Morbidity Components of
the Value of Statistical Life, 46 J. HEALTH EcoN. 90, 92 (2016) [hereinafter Gentry and
Viscusi (2016)]; see also W. Kip Viscusi, Using Datafrom the Census of FatalOccupational
Injuries to Estimate the "Value of a Statistical Life", MONTHLY LAB. REV., Oct. 2013, at 1, 2;
Elissa Philip Gentry & W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of a StatisticalLife for Transportation

Regulations: A Test of the Benefits Transfer Methodology, 51
(2015).
s2 Gentry & Viscusi (2016), supra note 51, at 92.
s3 Id.; Viscusi, supra note 51, at 2.
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the CFOI data includes information on the worker's country of origin,
which we leverage to construct fatality rates specific to immigrants.
We construct three different fatality rate measures based on three
different units of analysis. These three measures are fatality rates
indexed by industry, industry-immigrant status, and industryoccupation. To illustrate what a fatality rate for a given index means,
consider the construction of fatality rates by industry. A fatality rate of
1.2 for the publishing industry would mean that there were 1.2 deaths
per 100,000 workers in the publishing industry. We construct fifty such
industries based on the Census codes and define industries using the
same procedure as Gentry and Viscusi (2016).54
To explain how we construct fatality rates, consider the procedure
used to create fatality rates indexed by industry. Constructing fatality
rates first requires determining the value of the numerator-that is, we
must determine the number of deaths in each industry for each year. To
do so, we sum the total number of fatalities in each industry for workers
between ages 16 and 64. This summed value is the numerator in the
fatality rate.
Next, we must calculate the denominator. For this calculation, we
follow the accepted hours-based fatality rate procedure and calculate
the number of worker-hours in each industry cell using data from the
National Bureau of Economic Research's Merged Outgoing Rotation
Groups from the CPS.55 The CPS is published by the U.S. Census Bureau
and is widely used in the labor economics literature as an accurate
measure of the workforce.5 6 To calculate the number of hours, we
multiply the average reported hours worked by employees in each
industry by the number of employed workers in that industry. This
value is the denominator for the fatality rate for a given year.
As a final note, because few deaths occur in some industries or
occupations, we use three-year rolling averages to calculate the fatality
rate. Thus, the numerator is the sum of fatalities for three years and the
denominator is the sum of total hours worked by all employees each
year for three years.
Formally, the annual fatality rate is
FatalityRate =

(E)

* 200,000,000

s4 Gentry & Viscusi (2016), supra note 51, at 92. For clarity, we matched the NAICS
codes in the CFOI to census codes before aggregating the census codes into 50 industries
according to CPS categories.
ss See id.
56 See, e.g., Gentry and Viscusi (2016), supra note 51.
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where N is the number of fatal work injuries, EH is the total hours
worked by all employees during the calendar year, and 200,000,000 is
the base for 100,000 full-time employees working a forty-hour
workweek fifty weeks each year.
We also construct fatality rates indexed by industry-occupation
and industry-immigrant status in the same way.57 For the industryoccupation fatality rates, we divide the sample into an industryoccupation grid, where the occupations are the nine blue-collar
occupations that are widely accepted as some of the most dangerous in
the country, and the fifty industries are the same as those used above. 58
Thus, a fatality rate indexed by industry-occupation refers to the fatality
rate for a particular industry-occupation combination. For instance, a
fatality rate of 1.0 for the publishing industry-transportation occupation
cell would mean that one person working in the transportation
occupation in the publishing industry died for every 100,000 workers in
that job. Likewise, the fatality rate indexed by industry-immigrant
status reflects the number of deaths per 100,000 workers in each
industry based on immigrant status. We determine whether a fatality in
the CFOI dataset belonged to an immigrant if the worker was born in a
foreign region.
B. ComparingImmigrant and Native Risk Levels
This Section uses the fatality rates constructed in Section A to
compare immigrant and native risks. We show that immigrants work a
disproportionate share of fatalities and have a higher average fatality
rate than native workers.
1. Ratio of Immigrant Fatalities to Share of the Workforce
Immigrants bear a disproportionate share of fatal workplace
injuries, as evidenced by the fact that the ratio between their share of
workplace fatalities is greater than their corresponding share of the
workforce. Figure 1 plots the share of workplace fatalities belonging to
immigrants against the share of immigrants in the workforce between
2003 and 2015.59 Between 2003 and 2015, immigrants composed
between 11 and 14 percent of the workforce. 60 During this time,

57 For a more detailed discussion of constructing fatality rates based on industryoccupation groupings, see Gentry &Viscusi (2016), supra note 51, at 92.
se See supra note 50.
s9 To calculate the share of workplace fatalities belonging to immigrants, we divided
the number of immigrant fatalities by the total number of fatalities in the CFOI data for
each year.
60 We use data from the CPS to estimate the immigrant share of the workforce.
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however, they experienced between 15 and 18 percent of workplace
fatalities.
Accordingly, the relative immigrant share of fatalities
exceeded 1.0 for each year illustrated in Figure 1. Though this ratio
peaked in 2005 at 1.42, it has generally declined since, except for a
recent bump from 1.06 to 1.16 in 2015, which reversed the downward
trend of the previous two years. Nevertheless, compared to the starting
points in 2003, the curves in Figure 1 have narrowed, as the relative
share of immigrant fatalities more closely tracks their share in the
workforce.
Overall, the fact that immigrants bear a disproportionate share of
workplace fatalities provides evidence that they generally do worse
than native workers, at least in terms of job risks. Moreover, this trend
has persisted over time; at no time between 2003 and 2015 was the
ratio between the immigrant share of the workforce and their share of
fatalities less than 1.0.
Figure 1: Immigrant Share of FatalitiesPlotted againstImmigrantShare
of the Workforce6 l

61 The totals and calculations of fatal injury data were generated by researchers at
Vanderbilt University with restricted access to the CFOI research file. U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (restricted research file) (on file
with author).
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2. Comparing Immigrant and Native Fatality Rates
Evidence based on risk levels associated with the workers in the
CPS also shows that immigrants are concentrated in more dangerous
jobs than native workers. The CPS is a large sample dataset that
includes employment and demographic information for the native U.S.
workforce along with information on a worker's country of origin, which
is used to determine whether the worker is an immigrant. We describe
the CPS data in more detail in Section V.A, infra, but for now it is
sufficient to state that CPS includes information on a worker's industry,
occupation, and immigrant status.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for three different fatality
rate measures-industry,
industry-occupation,
and industryimmigrant-for CPS data from 2003, 2007, and 2015. The data are
presented for different groups based on immigrant status and, if the
worker is an immigrant, whether the worker emigrated from Mexico.
We break out immigrants from Mexico separately because of related
research showing that they bear the brunt of immigrant fatalities. 62
Table 1 shows that fatality rates for all workers were relatively constant
between 2003 and 2007, ranging from 4.4 deaths to 6.0 deaths per
100,000 workers in 2003 and 4.4 to 6.1 deaths per 100,000 workers in
2007. In 2015, however, the fatality rate for all workers decreased to
between 3.3 and 5.2 deaths, depending on the measure, resulting in a
decrease between 15 and 45 percent from 2007 to 2015. Immigrants
experienced a similar trend. Their fatality rate across the three
measures was approximately the same in 2003 and 2007, but the
immigrant fatality rate was between 15 and 32 percent lower from 2007
to 2015. Much of this downward trend for both groups is due to the
change in the industry mix of jobs in the economy.
In addition, by most fatality measures, immigrants experienced a
higher average fatality risk than native workers in 2003, 2007, and
2015. To illustrate, consider 2007, where immigrants had a higher
fatality rate than native workers using the industry and industryimmigrant fatality rate measures. This was also true in 2003, and in
2015 immigrants had a higher overall fatality rate than native workers
across all three measures of job risks. Additionally, across all three
years, Mexican immigrants had a substantially higher fatality rate than
non-Mexican immigrants. For instance, in 2015, Mexican immigrants'
fatality rate ranged from between 60 to 65 percent higher than nonMexican immigrants. Overall, immigrants from Mexico had the highest
average fatality risk of any group assessed in the CPS.
62

Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 5, at 768.
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Table 1: Risk Levels for CurrentPopulationSurvey Sample Groups (rates
per 100,000full-time equivalent workers)63
2003

Immigrants

Mexican
Immigrants

NonMexican
Immigrants

6.0

5.8

7.4

4.7

4.4

4.4

4.5

5.9

3.6

Rate

5.0

5.0

5.1

6.6

4.1

Sample Size

67,857

56,444

11,413

4,660

6,753

Immigrants

Mexican
Immigrants

NonMexican
Immigrants

All
Workers

Native
Workers

6.0

Industry Rate
IndustryImmigrant

IndustryOccupation
Rate

2007
All
Workers

Native
Workers

IndustryOccupation
Rate
Industry Rate
IndustryImmigrant
Rate
Sample Size

6.1

6.1

6.0

7.5

4.9

4.4

4.3

4.7

5.9

3.7

4.8

4.7

5.1

6.5

4.1

66,872

54,200

12,672

5,392

7,280

2015
NonImmigrants

Mexican
Immigrants

Mexican
Immigrants

5.2

5.4

7

4.4

3.4

3.9

5.1

3.1

3.3

3.2

3.5

4.6

2.8

60,800

49,315

11,485

4,579

6,906

All
Workers

Native
Workers

5.2

Industry Rate
IndustryImmigrant
Rate

3.5

Sample Size

IndustryOccupation
Rate

63 The totals and calculations of fatal injury data were generated by researchers at
Vanderbilt University with restricted access to the CFOI research file. U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, supra note 61.

2021]

PROTECTING IMMIGRANT WORKERS

951

C. Immigrants Remain in High-Risk Jobs over Time
Our concern with the well-being of immigrant workers would be
dampened a bit if they were able to move out of high-risk jobs into safer
pursuits. But this hopeful scenario is not the case. In addition to
experiencing a higher fatality rate, immigrants also remain locked into
high-risk jobs over time. This Section uses the NIS to empirically
demonstrate that a large portion of new immigrants to the United States
remained in high-risk jobs between the two waves of the NIS. Most
strikingly, this pattern holds true for immigrants in the highest quartile
of job risks-roughly half of all immigrants in this quartile of very risky
jobs either increase their job risk or remain in a job with roughly the
same risk level between the two waves. These results also have
implications for OSHA policy, which we briefly discuss at the end of this
Section.
To conduct our analysis in this Section, we use data from the NIS,
which is a data source provided by the National Institutes of Health,
National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, and the
National Institute on Aging/Office of Behavioral and Social Science
Research. The NIS sample consists of 8,573 new legal immigrants that
received permanent resident status in 2003. The NIS is a panel dataset
that tracks the same immigrant group across two survey waves. The
first wave occurred in 2003, and the second was conducted between
2007 and 2009. Panel datasets observe the same individual over
multiple periods 64 and can therefore be used to explore what happens
to the same person over time. The NIS collected information on legal
immigrants on a variety of measures, such as the respondent's country
of origin, English reading and writing proficiency, education attainment,
employment history in the United States and their country of origin,
gender, and income. Notably for this Section's purposes, the NIS also
asks immigrants which occupation and industry grouping they belong
to in both waves of the survey. This information, combined with fatality
risks for every industry and occupation combination developed in the
procedure outlined in Section III.B, permits us to analyze how many
immigrants move from safer jobs to riskier ones, from riskier jobs to
safer ones, or remain in the same job or risk level.
Before turning to our main results for this Section reported in
Figure 2, we first provide summary statistics for the immigrants that
compose the sample of immigrants for which complete industry and
occupation data is available for both waves. This sample consists of
2,176 observations. Except for hourly wages and education, Table 2
64

FUMIO HAYASHI, ECONOMETRICS

323 (2000).
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provides summary statistics for every observation used to construct
Figure 2. The average hourly wage in Wave 1 was $15.68 per hour,
which increased to $21.45 in Wave 2. Since most of the immigrant
characteristics summarized in Table 2 were relatively constant between
the two periods, our discussion of this table will focus on the statistics
in the second wave of the NIS. The average immigrant had fourteen
years of education, ten years of work experience in the United States,
and about 4.4 years of experience with their current employer.
Approximately 60 percent of the sample is male, and 74 percent of the
sample is married. Seven percent worked for the government and 12
percent belonged to a union. About 62 percent of the sample spoke
English and 68 percent understood English. Finally, 37 percent were
new arrivals to the United States.
Table 2: Summary Statisticsfor the NIS
Wave 2

Wave 1
Variable

Mean

N

Mean

N

Hourly Wage

15.68

1,743

21.45

1,688

Age

36.86

2,176

40.64

2,176

Education (Years)

13.88

2,172

14.07

2,172

Potential Experience in U.S.

5.06

2,176

9.59

2,176

Tenure

2.68

2,176

4.37

2,176

Male

0.60

2,176

0.60

2,176

Speak English

0.62

2,176

0.62

2,176

Understand English

0.68

2,176

0.68

2,176

Married

0.71

2,176

0.74

2,176

Government Employee

0.05

2,176

0.07

2,176

Union Member

0.11

2,176

0.12

2,176

New Arrival

0.37

2,176

0.37

2,176

Bearing this information in mind, we turn next to Figure 2, which
provides a first-pass assessment of how immigrants moved among safe
and risky jobs between the first wave of the NIS survey in 2003 and the
second wave in 2007. Figure 2 graphs the percentage of workers that
made a riskier job change, safer job change, or no job change. We define
a job change as any change in a worker's industry or occupation
category between 2003 and 2007. For this analysis, we include all
65
As an
occupations rather than only blue-collar occupations.

6s We impose this restriction later.
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illustrative example to understand how Figure 2 was created, suppose
that a person worked as a machinist in a foundry in 2003. In Wave 1,
this person would then be classified in the "Metals Manufacturing"
industry and the "production" occupation. If in 2007 the worker
remained at the foundry but became a construction laborer making new
buildings for the foundry, he would remain in the same industry but
move to a new occupation group, construction. Thus, he would be
classified as a job mover for our purposes, and, in this instance, his
workplace fatality risk would have increased, so he would be classified
as a "riskier job changer."66 We also break out Mexican immigrants
separately in Figure 2 because previous research and the results
reported in this Article indicate that Mexican immigrants face the
highest overall fatality risks and receive the lowest monetary
compensation for those risks.67
Figure 2 shows that immigrants are more likely to remain in their
jobs or switch to riskier jobs than they are to move to safer jobs. Looking
first at Mexican immigrants, who composed about 267 of the 2,171
immigrants for which complete data was available, 38 percent moved to
a riskier job, 27 percent stayed in the same job, and 35 percent moved
to a safer job. Thus, 65 percent of Mexican immigrants in the sample
made a riskier change or failed to improve their job risk. To be sure,
some of the "stayers" were already in safe jobs, but the fact that more
Mexican immigrants moved to a more dangerous job than moved to a
safer job shows that a large portion of Mexican immigrants did not get
safer over time. Figure 2 also shows that Mexican immigrants are the
only group who failed to improve their overall level of safety because
more workers moved to riskier jobs over time than moved into safer
employment.
Figure 2 also shows that many non-Mexican immigrants did not
transition to safer jobs. Though 36 percent of non-Mexican immigrants
made a safer job change, the remaining 64 percent of non-Mexican
immigrants remained in their same job or made a riskier job change.
Finally, looking at all immigrants, Figure 2 shows that 36 percent of all
immigrants moved to a safer job, 32 percent found a riskier job, and 32
percent remained in the same job. Thus, roughly two out of every three
immigrants stayed in the same risk group or increased their risk when
66

This worker would also be classified as a job changer if the worker remained in

the same machinist occupation in both waves, but moved industries to work for, say, a

paper mill classified in the Wood Products Manufacturing industry. Whether this
change would be classified as a safer or more dangerous change would depend on
whether the risk of dying in the new job was greater or less than that relative to his old
job.
67 Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 5; Byler, supra note 7, at 14.
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they changed jobs. Again, it is likely that some of the "stayers" were
already in safe jobs, but the fact that nearly one-third of immigrants
moved to a riskier job is indicative of the fact that many immigrants
failed to improve in terms of workplace safety.
Stepping back, Figure 2 illustrates overall that a substantial portion
of immigrants did not sort themselves into safer jobs between 2003 and
2007. This, in conjunction with the fact that immigrants face higher job
risks overall,68 suggests that immigrants enter jobs with high fatality
risks when they first arrive, and then a substantial proportion, based on
the results of Figure 2, fail to move into safer jobs as time progresses.
These results inform our understanding of the lack of immigrant
progress under the Bush Administration. Although OSHA policies may
have encouraged some immigrants to transfer into safer occupations
over time, Figure 2 shows that a large portion of immigrants switched
to a higher-risk job between 2003 and 2007.
Figure 2: Changes in Job Risk (Percentages)6')

31

35
''

3

3

27

2.5
22

ti

Another way to assess whether immigrants substantially sort into
safer jobs is to explore how immigrants change job risks based on their
Wave 1 risk quartile. We conduct this analysis in Figures 3, 4, and 5. To

infra Section III.B.
69 The totals and calculations of fatal injury data were generated by researchers at
68 See

Vanderbilt University with restricted access to the CFOI research file. U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, supra note 61.
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construct these figures, we divide immigrants into four different risk
groups based on the fatality rate that they faced in their industryoccupation combination in the first wave of the NIS survey. The first
quartile consists of immigrants in the lowest 25 percent of job risks, the
second quartile consists of immigrants in the second-lowest 25 percent
of job risks, and so on. We classify an immigrant as belonging to the "No
Risk Change" group if the fatality rate for the immigrant's second job
was within 10 percent of the fatality rate for the immigrant's first job in
Wave 1 of the NIS. To illustrate, suppose a person's job had a fatality
rate of 1.0 death per 100,000 workers in Wave 1 of the NIS. This person
would belong to the second quartile in Wave 1.70 If the fatality rate of
their second job was 0.90 deaths per 100,000 workers, this person
would be classified in the "No Risk Change." If, however, this person
moved to a job that had a fatality rate of 0.89 deaths per 100,000
workers, they would belong to the "Risk Decreased" group. If their
second job had a fatality rate of greater than 1.1 deaths per 100,000
workers, they would belong to the "Risk Increased" group.
Figures 3, 4, and 5 are useful because they permit analyzing
whether immigrants remained in approximately the same risk group in
both waves of the NIS survey or if they increased or decreased their risk
In short, these figures provide a finer
between the two waves.
framework in which to analyze how immigrants fare in terms of job
risks over time. If a large portion of immigrants is moving to a higherrisk quartile or remaining in the same risk quartile, we have evidence
suggesting that immigrants are not sorting themselves into safer jobs
over time. Figures 3, 4, and 5 are based on 2,158 total observations.7 1

70 The risk groups in the four quartiles in Figures 3, 4, and 5 are as follows: The first
quartile includes all immigrants with workplace fatality risks between zero and 0.76
deaths per 100,000 workers. The second quartile includes all immigrants with
workplace fatality risks between 0.76 and 1.14 deaths. The third quartile includes all
immigrants with fatality risks between 1.15 and 2.81 deaths. Finally, the fourth quartile
includes all immigrants with fatality risks between 2.82 and 35.88 deaths per 100,000.
71 The observations are lower because we lack some fatality rates for some industryoccupation groups due to the nature of the construction of fatality rates indexed by
industry-occupation. Otherwise, the 2,158 observations that we have data for perfectly
overlap with the 2,176 observations used to construct Figure 2.
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Figure 3: Risk Changes by Quartile, All Immigrants (Percentages) 72

27
22

28
23

119

Figure 3 analyzes risk changes for all immigrants for which
information was available. The first quartile of Figure 3 shows that 63
percent of immigrant workers moved to a job with a higher fatality risk
in the second wave of the NIS survey. To be sure, those in the lowest
risk group that switch jobs are hard pressed to find a job with a similar
or lower fatality rate, but the fact that nearly two-thirds of workers in
the first quartile increased their risk suggests some immigrants are not
remaining in safe jobs over time. Indeed, this phenomenon is born out
in the other three quartile groups as well. In each of the three groups,
about 50 percent of immigrants decreased their risks, but the other 50
percent remained in the same risk group or moved to a job with a higher
fatality risk between the first and second waves of the NIS. Notably,
nearly one out of every two immigrants in the fourth quartile-which
consists of those in the most dangerous jobs and is, therefore, most
indicative of how immigrants are doing in terms of job safetyincreased their fatality risk or failed to move to a job with a lower fatality
risk. Overall, Figure 3 illustrates that though there has certainly been
72 The totals and calculations of fatal injury data were generated by researchers at
Vanderbilt University with restricted access to the CFOI research file. U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, supra note 61. The risk-quartiles in Figures 3, 4, and 5 are as follows:
The first quartile consists of the safest industry-occupation groups with the lowest
fatality rates. The second quartile includes the second safest industry-occupation
groups. The third quartile includes the third safest industry-occupation groups. The
fourth quartile includes the most dangerous industry-occupation groups with the
highest fatality rates.
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some improvement in terms of immigrants sorting themselves into
safer jobs, a substantial portion, especially those in the riskiest quartile,
do not do so.
Figure 4: Risk Changes by Quartile, Mexican Immigrants (Percentages)7 3

63

60

53
511

123

Figure 4 breaks out risk changes by quartile for Mexican
immigrants, who represent 265 of the 2,158 immigrants for which
complete data was available. Here, the first quartile largely mirrored
what occurred in the first quartile of Figure 3: about two-thirds of
Mexican immigrants increased their fatality risk in the second wave of
the NIS, while the remainder stayed in a similar risk group or decreased
their overall fatality risk. Likewise, the activity in the second and third
quartiles in Figure 4 aligned with that of Figure 3. Again, the most telling
quartile in terms of how immigrants are doing in the labor market is the
fourth, high-risk quartile. Here, the movement between risk groups in
the fourth quartile for Mexican immigrants mirrored the fourth quartile
for all immigrants in Figure 3. Approximately half of all Mexican

73 The totals and calculations of fatal injury data were generated by researchers at
Vanderbilt University with restricted access to the CFOI research file. U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, supra note 61. The risk-quartiles in Figures 3, 4, and 5 are as follows:
The first quartile consists of the safest industry-occupation groups with the lowest
fatality rates. The second quartile includes the second safest industry-occupation
groups. The third quartile includes the third safest industry-occupation groups. The
fourth quartile includes the most dangerous industry-occupation groups with the
highest fatality rates.
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immigrants in this quartile increased their job risks or remained in the
fourth riskiest quartile, while about half reduced their workplace
fatality risks between the two waves.
Finally, Figure 5 analyzes risk changes for non-Mexican
immigrants. Figure 5 largely mirrors the results illustrated in Figure 3.
Again, the first quartile had the largest percentage of immigrant
workers that moved to a higher-risk job. The job movement in the
second, third, and fourth quartiles largely mirrored that exhibited for all
immigrants in Figure 3. Notably, in the fourth and most dangerous risk
quartile, just under half of all non-Mexican immigrants remained in the
same risk group or increased their fatality risk.
Figure 5: Risk Changes by Quartile, Non-Mexican Immigrants
(Percentages)?4
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Overall, Figures 3 through 5 show that many immigrants did not
substantially migrate into safer jobs between the first and second waves
of the NIS. Certainly, many immigrants across all quartiles did move to
a safer job. But the fourth quartile of Figures 3, 4, and 5-which

74 The totals and calculations of fatal injury data were generated by researchers at
Vanderbilt University with restricted access to the CFOI research file. U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, supra note 61. The risk-quartiles in Figures 3, 4, and 5 are as follows:
The first quartile consists of the safest industry-occupation groups with the lowest
fatality rates. The second quartile includes the second safest industry-occupation
groups. The third quartile includes the third safest industry-occupation groups. The
fourth quartile includes the most dangerous industry-occupation groups with the
highest fatality rates.
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represents the quartile with the most dangerous occupations-shows
that a substantial portion of immigrants remained in high-risk jobs or
increased their job risks. Thus, while some immigrants improved, many
did not, and this fact-coupled with the results in Sections III.B and V.D,
infra-shows that immigrants still face many struggles in the
workplace: they experience higher average fatality rates, are not
compensated for their job risks, and, in many cases, remain locked into
high-risk jobs over time. The results developed in this Section also shed
light on some of OSHA's policies under the Bush Administration. At this
time, OSHA compiled several Spanish-language resources and created
the Hispanic Workers Task Force to improve worker safety.7 s Given that
a large portion of the immigrant population remained in high-risk jobs
or moved to high-risk jobs between 2003 and 2007, however, these
trends suggest that the Bush Administration's efforts were not sufficient
to enable immigrant workers to transition into safer occupations.

IV. DO IMMIGRANTS GET PAID FOR RISKY JOBS? THEORY OF THE VSL
Part III of this Article demonstrated that immigrants experience a
higher overall fatality rate than native workers and that a significant
portion of immigrants remained in dangerous jobs over time. The
results developed in Part III may be less concerning, however, if it is also
the case that immigrant workers receive compensation in the form of
higher wages, or hazard pay, for their increased job risks. Research in
the economics literature suggests that immigrants do not receive wage
compensation for their increased job risks, as reflected by the fact that
their VSL is substantially lower than the VSL for native workers, and for
some immigrant groups may even be zero.7 6 This Part discusses a
theoretical explanation for why this may be the case. To preview,
immigrants receive lower hazard pay because they face a different
wage-offer curve than native workers, resulting in a lower
compensating differential for immigrants along with a lower
accompanying VSL.77 Section A provides background information to
Section B describes the theoretical
better understand the VSL.
derivation of the VSL. Finally, Section C explains in more detail why the
VSL may differ for immigrant workers.

7s These policies are described in more detail in Part VI.
76 Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 5, at 750.
7
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A. What is the VSL?

The VSL quantifies the benefit of avoiding a fatality. Today, the VSL
estimates range from 9 to 11 million dollars. 78 This figure reflects the
To
total compensation required per expected workplace death.
illustrate, suppose the average annual fatality rate for all workers is one
death per 10,000 workers. 79 Suppose also that in return for bearing this
risk, workers receive an annual wage premium of $1,000.80 The amount
of compensation that this group of workers would receive for one
workplace death would therefore be $10,000,000 or 10,000*$1,000.
Accordingly, the VSL would equal $10,000,000. In general, then, the VSL
can serve as a measure of whether workers receive compensation for
their job risks.
Though estimates of the VSL for workers generally are between 9
and 11 million dollars, the estimated VSL for immigrants is much lower.
In 2010, the estimated VSL for immigrants using the industryoccupation fatality rate measure was $3.19 million, which, at the time,
compared to a VSL of $8.8 million for native workers, indicates that
81
Mexican
immigrants receive less hazard pay than U.S.-born workers.
immigrants fared particularly poorly as they received no net wage
compensation for fatality risks, resulting in a VSL of zero for these
workers. 82 The following sections explain how immigrants can receive
less compensation for job risks than native workers by first outlining
the theoretical derivation of the VSL, followed by a theoretical rationale
for why immigrants have a lower VSL than native workers.
B. TheoreticalDerivation of the VSL
The Value of a Statistical Life is grounded in the fundamental
assumption that labor markets involve the exchange of goods and
services between workers and firms. 83 More dangerous jobs are
generally less desirable to risk-averse workers, and so, holding
everything else equal, these workers require higher wages to work

78

W. KIP

79

Id.

VIsCUsi, PRICING LIVES: GUIDEPOSTS FOR A SAFER SOCIETY

6 (2018).

80 Id. The $1,000 figure is derived statistically and includes controls for workers and
occupation characteristics.
81 Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 5, at 763. Estimates of the VSL using a different
dataset, the NIS, showed that immigrants had a VSL between $9 and $13 million.
Mexican immigrants still had a negative VSL, however. Id. at 767
82 Id. at 767.

83 Thomas J. Kniesner & W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of a StatisticalLife, OXFORD RSCH.

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECON. AND FIN.

979.013.138.

(2019), https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190625
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those more dangerous jobs. 84 In economic terms, this is referred to as a
compensating differential. 85 On the firm side, safer jobs are more costly
for firms to provide, and, again holding everything else equal, firms will
have to pay lower wages for safer jobs in a perfectly competitive
environment, and some workers will accept the lower wages in return
for safer jobs.86 This results in a locus of wage and job-risk combinations
in which the quantity of labor demanded equals the quantity of labor
supplied at every possible safety level. In economic terms, this is
referred to as the labor market hedonic equilibrium.
The labor market hedonic equilibrium can be described
algebraically by the equation w = w(p), where w represents the wage
and p represents the probability of a fatal injury at work.87 In other
words, the wage is a function of the job risk. Furthermore, the more
dangerous the job, the more firms must pay in wages, everything else
the same, to attract workers to that job. Note also that the proper
comparison is within an industry and occupation across workplaces. So
even though lawyers have higher paid and safer jobs than construction
workers, comparing lawyers to construction workers would be inapt
Rather, the focus is on situations such as test pilots being more highly
paid than commercial airline pilots because test pilots face such a higher
risk of death.88
The graphical representation of the labor market hedonic
equilibrium is a concave function, and the VSL directly follows from the
numerical value of the slope of the labor market hedonic wage
equilibria. 89 To illustrate, consider an example similar to the one
outlined in Section IV.A. Suppose the probability of an accidental death
in the workplace is one death per 10,000 workers. Suppose also that the
labor market reveals that for this level of risk the typical worker must
be paid an extra $1,000 per year to accept a job that has this risk level.
As a group, then, 10,000 workers would need to collect $10 million more
to compensate them for the risk that one more of their number were to
be killed in the next year. In this example, then, the VSL is $10 million. 90

84 Id.
8s Id.
86

Id.

87 Id.
88 Id. Another example is for janitors. Janitors who clean the inside of a nuclear
reactor are paid about 16 times more than janitors who clean commercial office

buildings. Id.
89 Kniesner & Viscusi, supra note 83.
90 This is also the amount that the same group of workers would be willing to pay
via wage reductions to have a safer job where one fewer worker in their group would

be fatality injured. Id.
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More broadly, the VSL equals all the additional wage payments that
employers must pay to compensate their workers for workplace fatality
risk.
Another important result at play here involves the sorting of
workers to jobs in various firms. Because of the nature of the labor
market, firms with low workplace safety costs will hire those workers
who are least willing to bear workplace risks. 91 Similarly, firms with
high safety costs will hire workers who are most willing to bear
workplace risks that threaten their health or safety at work.9 2 In the
most simplified theoretical version of the VSL, this sorting of workers to
This simplified version assumes,
firms is economically efficient.
93
however, that all workers face a common labor market offer curve. In
practice, it may be the case that workers face different offer curves. As
explained in more detail in the following Section, this market
segmentation explains why immigrants do not receive compensation for
job risks. 94
C. The VSL for Immigrant Workers
This Section explains why the VSL may differ for immigrant
95
workers. This Article, along with previous research in economics,
shows that immigrants, especially those from Mexico, encounter large
fatality risks without receiving significant wage
workplace
compensation in return. 96
The explanation for why immigrants fare worse in the labor market
is grounded in standard economic wage theory. To illustrate, begin with
the same labor market described in Section IV.B. Now, however, relax
the assumption that all workers face the same wage-offer curve and
instead let there be two offer curves, one for native workers and one for
immigrants. 97 Economists refer to a labor market characterized by two
offer curves as a segmented labor market. 98 So, even though immigrant
workers may be able to choose from among the same set of jobs as
native workers, they receive a lower level of compensation for each level
of risk.99 Furthermore, segmented labor markets are theoretically

91

Id.

92
93

Id.
Id.

94

Id.

9s Id. at 749-50.
96

Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 5, at 750.

97

Id.
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98
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possible so long as employers can distinguish between the two labor
market groups and offer different sets of jobs based upon observable
characteristics of one group.1oo Immigrants can be readily identified by
their potential employers, therefore they could face a different
provision of wage-offer curves based upon their status as immigrants.10
The next Part uses the theoretical insights developed here to design
an empirical model that shows that immigrants fail to receive hazard
pay for their workplace fatality risks.
V. RESULTS

This Section uses data from the CPS to show that immigrants do not
receive a wage premium for their workplace fatality risks. We also show
that this result holds for Mexican immigrants. To reach this result, we
leverage the theoretical insights developed in the previous Part to
design an empirical specification that accounts for a segregated labor
market in which immigrants face a different wage-offer curve than
native workers. Moreover, the results in this Part bolster the conclusion
that immigrants suffer in the labor market relative to native workers.
Section III.B showed that immigrants face a higher average fatality risk
than native workers, Section III.C showed that a substantial portion of
immigrants remains locked into high-risk jobs over time, and this Part
empirically shows that immigrants do not receive hazard pay for job
risks.
This Part proceeds as follows. Section A discusses the data used to
derive these results. Section B outlines our empirical specification.
Section C discusses previous results in the economics literature showing
that immigrants do not receive hazard pay for job risks. Finally, Section
D provides new evidence that immigrants, even in 2015, do not receive
compensation for workplace fatality risks.
A. Data Sources
This Section uses data from the CPS to estimate log-wage
regression equations that test whether immigrants receive
compensation for job risks. The CPS is a large sample dataset that
includes employment and demographic information for the native U.S.
workforce along with information on a worker's country of origin, which
is used to determine whether the worker is an immigrant. 102 We use the
100 Id. at 751.
101 Id. at 751.
102

National Bureau of Economic Research, Current Population Survey (CPS) Data at

the NBER, https://www.nber.org/research/data/current-population-survey-cps-datanber (last visited February 9, 2021).
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Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (MORG), a subsample of the CPS, in
our analysis because this sample includes information on the worker's
income. The MORG also includes information on worker age, education,
gender, race, occupation, and industry. Summary statistics for the key
variables of the log-wage regression equation used to estimate fatality
risks are reported in Appendix Table 1. We focus on 2007 and 2015
because 2007 corresponds with the second year of the NIS survey and
2015 is the most recent year for which our CFOI data is available. To
compare with the first wave of the NIS survey in 2003, we reference
results from Hersch and Viscusi (2010), described in Section V.C.
Overall, the results from these regressions can, in conjunction with
results from the NIS survey, inform our understanding of how
immigrants fare in the workplace.
We made a number of restrictions to the sample to align with best
practices in the economics literature. First, we restricted the CPS
sample to workers in occupations that were traditionally characterized
as blue-collar jobs since the greatest job risks are associated with these
This restriction is common throughout the VSL
occupations.1 03
04
literature.1 We also limit the CPS samples to workers that are not selfemployed-since the CPS does not report earnings for self-employed
workers-and to those with hourly wages from $1.50 to $100 and
between the ages of eighteen and sixty-four. Summary statistics for the
variables included in this analysis are presented in Appendix Table 1.
Appendix Table 1 shows that the average hourly wage in 2007 and
2015 was $16:60 per hour and $19 per hour, respectively. Experience
ranged from 22 years in 2007 to 22.4 years in 2015. Time spent
receiving education was relatively constant across the two sample
years, ranging from 12.5 and 12.8 years. Union membership declined
from 14.8 percent of the 2007 sample to 12.8 percent of the 2015
sample. The percent of white workers was roughly the same in 2007
and 2015, ranging between 79.1 percent and 81.9 percent of each
sample. The percent of Hispanic workers increased between 2007 and
2015-approximately 17.5 percent of the sample in 2007 was Hispanic
compared to 18.8 percent in 2015. The percentage of immigrants was
18.9 percent in both 2007 and 2015. Finally, the percentage of Mexican
immigrants was 8.1 percent in 2007 and 7.5 percent in 2015.

103 These occupations are listed above in footnote 58.
104 See, e.g., Gentry & Viscusi (2016), supra note 51, at 92; Hersch & Viscusi, supra

note 5, at 755.
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B. Empirical Specification
The empirical specification applies the theoretical insights
developed in Part IV. We leverage the canonical log-wage equation used
throughout labor economics to test whether immigrants are
compensated for their workplace risks similarly to native workers.1 05 In
short, this equation represents the log(Hourly Wage) for a given worker
as a linear function of all of the worker's individual characteristics, such
as the worker's education or gender, along with the worker's particular
job, the fatality rate for that job, and the worker's immigrant status. In
this way, this regression specification permits us to estimate the effect
of the worker's workplace fatality risk while controlling for other factors
that affect the worker's wage, such as education, gender, or race. This
regression specification also permits a separate labor market
equilibrium for immigrants that would differ in terms of the wage level
and slope of the estimated wage-risk combination, as outlined above. 106
We achieve this separate equilibrium by including an indicator variable
for whether the worker is an immigrant as well as an interaction term
for immigrant status and the worker's workplace fatality rate.1 07
The log-wage equation takes the following form:
=

30c + /3 1X + 32 FatalityRate + 1s Immigrant
/34 Immigrant x Fatality Rate + e

+

In(Wage)

The dependent variable in this equation is the log of wages for an
individual worker. The hourly wage is reported directly for most
workers in the CPS, but we calculated the hourly wage for some workers
by dividing weekly earnings by the worker's usual weekly hours (CPS).
Control variables are reflected by the vector X. These variables include
indicator variables for a worker's race (White, Black, American Indian,
Asian or Pacific Islander, or more than one race reported), Hispanic
ethnicity, sex, marital status, union status, indicator variables for the
worker's broad occupation group, and indicators for whether the
worker is employed by the government, employed full time, or paid on
an hourly basis. We also control for a worker's education. In the CPS,
we impute education using the highest education attainment of a
worker. The CPS does not have specific information on work history.

10s See, e.g, Joseph E. Aldy & W. Kip Viscusi, Adjusting the Value of a Statistical Life for
Age and Cohort Effects, 9 REV. EcoN. & STAT. 573, 575 (2008); Hersch & Viscusi, supra note
5, at 753.
106

Id.

107

Id.
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We therefore approximate experience by potential experience, which is
defined as age minus years of education minus five.108
The key variables in this regression are the fatality rate, a binary
variable for immigrant status, and an interaction term, Immigrant x
Fatality Rate. We use the industry fatality rate measure in our primary
regression. Immigrant is a binary variable equal to one if the worker is
an immigrant and zero otherwise. The final term, Immigrant x Fatality
Rate, represents the interaction between immigrant status and the
fatality rate. Including this term is worthwhile for two reasons. First, as
explained above, including the interaction term permits a separate labor
market equilibrium for immigrant workers. Second, interaction terms
in general permit a more nuanced understanding of how immigrant
workers are compensated for their fatality risks. The interaction term
lets us test whether the effect of the fatality rate on a worker's wages
differs based on whether the worker is an immigrant.
C. Results in the Previous Literature
Before providing new estimates of immigrants' failure to receive
hazard pay, we show in this Section that our results align with previous
results in the literature, implying that Mexican immigrants, in
particular, continue to fail to receive wage compensation for the high
fatality risks that they face. Most notably, Hersch and Viscusi (2010) use
the CPS and Wave 1 of the NIS to estimate log-wage equations similar to
those used in this Article 109 to test whether immigrant workers receive
compensation for their workplace risks. Hersch and Viscusi found that
immigrants are concentrated in high-risk jobs and receive little to no
boost in wages to compensate them for their on-the-job risks.1 10 They
also showed that Mexican immigrants suffer: despite incurring much
higher fatality risks than U.S. workers, Mexican immigrants receive no
compensation for job risks."1 1 Hersch and Viscusi also calculated VSLs
for all workers, immigrant workers, and Mexican immigrant workers.
Using the CPS dataset, Hersch and Viscusi found that the VSL for native
workers ranges from $8.8 million to $10.22 million while the VSL for
immigrant workers ranges from -$3.64 million to $3.19 million,
12
depending on the fatality rate measure used in the analysis.1 Using the
NIS dataset, which only includes immigrants, Hersch and Viscusi found

This is the standard practice in the literature. See, e.g., id. at 756.
See infra Section V.D.
110 Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 5, at 749.
ui Id.
112 Id. at 763.
108

109
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that the VSL for immigrants ranged between $7.21 and $9.35 million. 113
Immigrants from Mexico, however, receive no wage compensation for
their job risks. In fact, Hersch and Viscusi found that the VSL for these
immigrants was negative.
D. New Estimates of Immigrant'sFailureto Receive Hazard Pay
This Section provides new estimates illustrating that immigrants,
particularly those from Mexico, fail to receive hazard pay for workplace
fatality risks. We first present results for immigrants generally before
breaking our results into Mexican and non-Mexican immigrant groups.
Table 3 presents estimates of the key risk and immigrant status
variables using the CPS dataset for 2007 and 2015. We focus on the
results using the industry fatality rates for ease of analysis. Overall,
Table 3 shows that all workers receive a statistically significant
compensating differential for fatality risks. Immigrants, however, do
not receive any compensation for the fatality risks they face on the job.
Table 3 shows that all workers receive positive compensation for
job risks because the coefficient of the fatality rate variable is positive
and statistically significant at the five percent level. We can therefore
calculate the VSL for all workers in this specification. The VSL for a
standard log-wage equation is calculated using the following
equation: 114

VSL = B2 * Average Wage * 2,000 * 100,000
Here, B2 represents the estimated coefficient for the fatality rate
variable, the average wage is the average hourly wage for the sample,
2,000 assumes a forty-hour workweek, and 100,000 normalizes the VSL
since the fatality rate is measured per 100,000 workers. Using this
formula, the VSL in Table 3 for all workers is estimated at $9.6 million
in 2007 and $10.7 million in 2015. These results align with VSL
estimated for 2003 in Hersch and Viscusi (2010), which was $9.9 million
using the industry fatality rate measure.115

113 Id. at 767.
114 Gentry & Viscusi, supra note 51, at 93.
11s See, e.g., Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 5, at 763.
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Table 3: Log-Wage Regressions Based on Industry FatalityRates, All
Immigrants11 6
VARIABLES
Fatality Rate

Immigrant x Fatality Rate
Immigrant

(1)
2007

(2)
2015

0.0029**

0.0028**

(0.0004)
-0.0049**
(0.0009)
-0.0167*
(0.0071)

(0.0006)
-0.0062**
(0.0011)
-0.0162*
(0.0074)

$16.61

$19.04

$9.6

$10.7

Observations

66,872

60,800

R-squared

0.3462

0.3322

Wage
Value of Statistical Life ($ Millions)

Table 3 also shows that immigrants are not compensated for job
risks because the coefficient on the interaction term, Immigrant x
Fatality Rate, is negative and statistically significant. This means that
the VSL for immigrants is negative. To illustrate, first note that
calculating the VSL with an interaction term is similar to calculating the
VSL from the standard log-wage equation. Here, the relevant formula is
117

VSL = (B 2 + B4 ) * Average Wage * 2,000 * 100,000
Because 0.0019 + (-0.0036) is less than zero, the estimated VSL for
immigrants is negative, which violates standard economic theory.11 8
Accordingly, we instead estimate the amount of money that immigrants
lose because they are not compensated for job risks relative to native
workers. To do this, first note that all workers receive compensation
equal to the average fatality rate multiplied by the VSL:
Total Compensation = VSL * FatalityRate
Applying this formula to the most recent data from 2015, we
estimated that the VSL for all workers was approximately $10,700,000,
and the average fatality rate, using industry as the index, was 3.5 deaths

.

+

116 The totals and calculations of fatal injury data were generated by researchers at
Vanderbilt University with restricted access to the CFOl research file. U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, supra note 61. Standard errors in parentheses: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05,
p< 0 .1
117 Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 5, at 761.
118 W. Kip Viscusi & Clayton Masterman, Anchoring Biases in InternationalEstimates
of the Value of a StatisticalLife, 54J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 103, 104 (2017).
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per 100,000 workers.
Therefore, all workers received annual
compensation of $374.50 in hazard pay. Our results in Table 3, however,
show that immigrants did not enjoy this level of compensation. In fact,
these results show that immigrants were underpaid by $505 for work in
dangerous jobs relative to what they would have been paid in jobs
without any fatality risk.ll 9 This type of result would not be plausible if
immigrants had broad access to these safer jobs. Summing together the
compensation for natives with immigrants' lost wages shows that there
is an $880 gap between native workers and immigrants in the average
amount of compensation for occupational fatality risks.
Next, to test how Mexican immigrant workers fared, we divided
immigrant workers into two groups: Mexican and non-Mexican
immigrants. Table 4 presents estimates of the key risk and immigrant
status variables for these two groups. To understand the differential
impact of risk on Mexican and non-Mexican immigrant workers, we
interact each measure of the fatality rate with whether a worker is a
Mexican immigrant or whether the worker is a non-Mexican immigrant.
Thus, we end up with two interaction terms: Mexican Immigrant x
Fatality Rate and non-Mexican Immigrant x Fatality Rate.12 o
Table 4 shows the coefficient on the industry fatality rate variable
is positive and statistically significant. This yields a positive VSL for all
workers of $9.4 million in 2007, and $11 million in 2015. Again, these
results align with the VSL estimated for 2003 in Hersch and Viscusi
(2010), which was $9.9 million using the industry fatality rate
measure. 121 Using the same methodology as before and focusing on
2015, this means that all workers received $385 in hazard pay. Mexican
immigrants do not receive hazard pay, however. Across all three years,
the interaction term Fatality Rate * Mexican Immigrant is negative and
statistically significant, indicating that Mexican immigrants receive
lower compensation for their fatality risk. In 2015, this amounted to
$932 in lost pay. Non-Mexican immigrants fared better, however. The
coefficient on their interaction term was only negative and statistically
significant in 2015, but this immigrant group still lost $189 as a result of
their failure to receive hazard pay.

119 This calculation requires estimating a negative VSL for immigrants. This negative
VSL was approximately equal to negative $12.9 million in 2015. The average fatality
rate for immigrants was 3.9 deaths per 100,000 workers.
120 This is an accepted practice in the VSL literature. See, e.g., Hersch & Viscusi, supra
note 5, at 767.
121

See, e.g., Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 5, at 763.
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Table 4: Log-Wage Regressions Using Industry FatalityRates, Comparing
Mexican and non-Mexican Immigrants12 2
(1)

(2)

VARIABLES

2007

2015

Fatality Rate

0.0029**

0.0029**

(0.0004)

(0.0006)

-0.0075**

-0.0077**

(0.0012)

(0.0015)

-0.0094

-0.0074

(0.0112)

(0.0117)

-0.0016

-0.0045**

(0.0013)

(0.0016)

-0.0257**

-0.0223**

(0.0082)

(0.0086)

Wage

$16.61

19.04

Value of Statistical Life (Millions)

$9.4

$11.0

Observations

66,872

60,800

R-squared

0.3462

0.3322

Mexican

Immigrant x Fatality Rate

Mexican Immigrant
Non-Mexican Immigrant x Fatality Rate
Non-Mexican Immigrant

Overall, the results developed in this Section pair with those
developed earlier in the paper to show that immigrants, particularly
those from Mexico, fare quite poorly in the labor market. Immigrants
experience higher workplace fatality risks, do not always move to safer
jobs over time, and do not receive hazard pay to compensate them for
job risks.

.

+

122 The totals and calculations of fatal injury data were generated by researchers at
Vanderbilt University with restricted access to the CFOI research file. U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, supra note 61. Standard errors in parentheses: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05,
p< 0 .1
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VI. DiscUSSION
The previous Parts empirically demonstrated that immigrant
workers in the United States often suffer in the labor market,
particularly compared to their native peers. This Part leverages those
results to comment on the efficacy of past OSHA programs designed to
improve immigrant workplace safety and informs our policy
recommendations for ways in which OSHA can further improve
immigrant welfare on the job site. Section A of this Part describes
immigrant outreach programs conducted by the OSHA under the Bush,
Obama, and Trump Administrations. Section B then assesses the
efficacy of these policies in light of the empirical conclusions reached in
the previous Parts. Finally, Section C outlines one modest and one more
ambitious policy proposal that OSHA could adopt to improve
immigrant-worker outcomes in the labor market.
A. OSHA Policies
OSHA's organic statute directs the agency to protect all workers in
the workplace. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 states
in its preamble that OSHA's goal is to "assure safe and healthful working
conditions for working men and women."1 23 OSHA's statutory charge
includes immigrants, yet there has long been a perception that
immigrant workers, particularly Hispanic workers, fare worse than
native workers in terms of workplace safety.1 24 This is all the more
concerning given that immigrants compose about 17 percent of the
workforce and work in some of the most dangerous jobs in the
country.12 s
In fulfillment of its organic statute, OSHA has undertaken
immigrant outreach programs under the Bush and Obama
Administrations, and to a lesser extent under the Trump
Administration, to improve immigrant workplace safety. This Section
first details some of these outreach programs before outlining some of
the guidance documents and regulations that OSHA has promulgated to
encourage employers to provide safety training in a language that their
workers can understand.

123 29 U.S.C. § 651.
124 See, e.g., Henshaw, supra note 10; Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 5, at 794-51; Loh

& Richardson, supra note 7, at 42.
12s See supra Section I.C.
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1. Immigrant Outreach Programs
The Occupational Health and Safety Administration is tasked with
"assuring safe and healthful working conditions for working men and
women," 2 6 and has the statutory authority to promulgate rules and
regulations to protect worker safety. OSHA's statutory charge includes
immigrants, 127 yet immigrant workers, particularly Hispanic workers,
face higher workplace risks than native workers.1 28 This phenomenon
has not escaped OSHA's attention, and we next provide an overview of
some of the OSHA initiatives and policies that have been put in place to
address immigrant safety in the workforce.
In 2002, then-Assistant Secretary of Labor for OSHA John Henshaw
released a statement lamenting the number of deaths in the workforce,
including the fact that Hispanic and Latino workers, many of them
9
immigrants, bore a disproportionate share of those deaths. 2
Recognizing this problem, Secretary Henshaw announced that OSHA
was creating a number of programs to reduce the number of fatal
workplace injuries among non-English speaking workers, particularly
Hispanic or Latino workers.3o These programs included creating a
Hispanic Workers Task Force, establishing an 800 number for Spanishspeaking individuals, initiating a national clearinghouse for training
programs in Spanish, creating a Spanish-language website for
employees and employers, and compiling a list of fluent Spanishspeaking employees across OSHA.131 In addition to creating the Task
Force, OSHA also used safety and health training grants to establish
training programs for non-English speaking employees and employers
that hire non-English speakers. These programs were designed to
32
reduce fatalities among the non-English speaking workforce.1
During this time, OSHA also engaged in state and local outreach
programs to address immigrant fatalities. For instance, the Agency
distributed a number of educational tools written in Spanish throughout
Florida, such as a poster depicting four major construction hazards and
33
In Fort
a packet explaining the dangers of overhead power lines.1
Worth, OSHA also provided a ten-hour course on construction safety in
126 29 U.S.C. § 651.
127 See Henshaw, supra note 10.
128 Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 5, at 749.
129 Henshaw, supra note 10.

130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.

The agency also offered two ten-hour construction classes in the Fort

Lauderdale area after teaming up with a Florida consulting company that specializes in
safety and health advice to small business. Id.
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Spanish, and the Fort Worth OSHA office worked with the Hispanic
Chamber of Commerce to coordinate safety courses in Spanish. 134
Though these programs likely had localized successes in improving
immigrant-worker safety, they were not systematically implemented on
a nationwide basis. Finally, the Task Force created a clearinghouse for
Spanish safety and health training materials developed by others on the
OSHA website.13 s
OSHA's policies toward immigrant workers in the early 2000s were
also the subject of Congressional oversight. In 2003, the Department of
Labor released a report called "Evaluation of OSHA's Handling of
Immigrant Fatalities in the Workplace" at the request of Senator Charles
E. Schumer.1 36 This report addressed how OSHA had been addressing
immigrant workplace fatalities and focused on four questions: (1) how
did OSHA keep track of immigrant fatalities, (2) what resources did
OSHA allocate to investigating those deaths, (3) what resources does
OSHA allocate to enforce workplace rules in industries that primarily
employ immigrants, and (4) how can OSHA prevent more immigrant
deaths?1 37 Regarding tracking immigrant workplace fatalities on the
job, the DOL found that OSHA's inspection priorities and reporting
requirements did not distinguish between immigrant and nonimmigrant workers.1 38 Addressing the question regarding the resources
OSHA allocated to investigating deaths, OSHA issued a memorandum
directing its investigators to begin collecting information about
workers' ethnicity and language capabilities so that the Agency could
better track immigrant versus non-immigrant fatalities.1 39 To address
the third question asking what resources OSHA used to investigate
industries that primarily employ immigrants, OSHA was unable to
provide the information needed to determine the resources allocated to
industries that primarily employed immigrants since the Agency did not
specifically target those industries. 40 Finally, with regard to how OSHA
can reduce immigrant deaths, the Report directed OSHA to do more than
just engage in Hispanic outreach efforts. 14 1 For instance, the report
stated that even though OSHA's regional offices translated training
134

Id.
135 Henshaw, supra note 10.
136

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT No. 21-03-023-10-001,
OSHA'S HANDLING OF IMMIGRANT FATALITIES IN THE WORKPLACE iii (2003),

EVALUATION OF

https://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2003/21-03-023-10-001.pdf.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. at iv.
140 Id.
141

Id.
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materials based on their knowledge of their region's needs, they did not
have a systematic process for doing so, and therefore could not
systematically determine which languages and what literacy levels their
documents needed to be translated into.142
Finally, to help prevent further workplace fatalities, the report
made several recommendations as to OSHA's handling of immigrant
For instance, the Report
workplace fatality investigations.143
recommended that OSHA ensure that its staff has sufficient
second-language capability and that the Agency issue an Interpretation
Letter clarifying that OSHA's "training provisions require employers to
provide training in a manner that employees understand," after taking
into account the employee's particular language abilities.1 44 The Report
also recommended that OSHA examine the deterrent effect of increasing
45
fines for willful violations that result in deaths.
These examples from the early 2000s are not exhaustive, but they
do illustrate that OSHA has long been concerned with reducing job risks
to immigrant workers, and this concern did not decrease under the
Obama administration. In April 2010, OSHA hosted the National Action
Summit for Latino Worker Health & Safety.146 The Summit developed
an agenda to address and prevent injuries and deaths among Hispanic
and Latino workers, many of whom are immigrants.1 47 The Summit
joined together more than five hundred people, including workers and
representatives from labor unions, community organizations, employer
associations, and government officials, to discuss ways to reduce Latino
workplace fatalities, particularly in the construction industry, which is
48
highly dangerous and employs a large number of Latino workers.
Follow-up summits and educational conferences were held in each
OSHA region to build on the ideas developed in the national OSHA
summit.1 49 Each of the summits was focused on providing vulnerable
worker populations-such as immigrant populations-with education,
training, and assistance. 5 0

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 136,
Id. at v.
144 Id.
142

at iv.

143

145

Id.

Press Release, Dep't of Labor, U.S. Secretary of Labor to Convene National Action
Summit on Latino Worker Safety and Health (Mar. 18, 2010), https://www.osha.gov/
146

archive/latinosummit/index.html.
147 Id.
148

Id.

149
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https://www.osha.gov/quicktakes/12012010.
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Finally, immigration policy has certainly been at the forefront of
the Trump Administration's agenda. While there have been no major
OSHA initiatives to address immigrant workplace fatalities, OSHA has
maintained some immigrant outreach programs under the Trump
administration. For instance, the OSHA website lists training resources
in Spanish for those that work in the construction industry.1 s OSHA's
website also provides Spanish-language compliance assistance
resources for employers. 15 2 In addition, some OSHA regions have
continued to engage in outreach programs with immigrant workers.
OSHA Region VI-which includes Texas, New Mexico, Louisiana,
Oklahoma, and Arkansas-partnered with the Workers Defense Project
in Austin, Texas, to distribute safety materials to immigrant workers.1 s3
OSHA Region VI also offered eleven "in-take nights" to provide Hispanic
workers with an opportunity to ask questions and file complaints with
OSHA.1s4
Immigrant workers have been a focus of OSHA's attention for
nearly two decades. Yet a comprehensive understanding of how
immigrant workers fare in the workplace is lacking in the legal
literature. This paper fills that gap, and in doing so also offers evidence
that OSHA's efforts over time have not reduced immigrant workplace
fatalities.
2. Language Training Requirements
In addition to outreach programs to train immigrant workers
directly in workplace dangers, OSHA has also, to some extent, mandated
that employers train immigrant workers in a language that they can
understand. Broadly, the Agency has issued guidance that employers
must provide training in a language that employees can comprehend.ss
This requirement has been enforced in court. In Modern Continental
Construction Company, Inc. v. OSHRC, the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit upheld an OSHA penalty against an employer who failed to train
151

Training Resources in Spanish Language, OCCUPATIONAL

SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN.,

https://www.osha.gov/dte/outreach/constructiongeneralindustry/spanishtraining.
html (last visited Jan. 13, 2020).
isz Spanish-Language Compliance Assistance Resources, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH ADMIN., https://www.osha.gov/complianceassistance/index-hispanic
(last
visited Jan. 13, 2020).
1s3 Region 6 - Annual Alliance Report, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN.,

https://www.osha.gov/alliances/regional/region6/alliance-annual-report_20190726
(last visited Jan. 13, 2020).
1s4

Id.
Memorandum from David Michaels, Assistant Sec'y for Occupational Safety and
Health, to Reg'l Adm'rs (April 28, 2010), https://www.osha.gov/dep/standards-policystatement-memo-04-28-10.html.
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its employees in safety procedures that could have prevented an
accident when the employer only provided training materials in English
"despite a large number of employees with limited English
proficiency." 5 6
In some settings, OSHA has also promulgated regulations that
require employers to post warning signs or provide training in a
language that workers can understand. For instance, OSHA mandates
that safety signs that warn workers of hazards "shall be understandable
5 7
In
to all employees who may be exposed to the identified hazard."
other words, OSHA requires warning signs to be posted in a language or
manner that non-English speakers can comprehend and act on.
Similarly, OSHA requires employers in the logging industry to "assure
that all training materials used are appropriate in content and
vocabulary to the educational level, literacy, and language skills of the
employees being trained." 5 8
These multilingual signage or training requirements do not extend
to all settings, however.1 59 For instance, OSHA currently requires that
employers with workers that may be exposed to hazardous chemicals in
the workplace must prepare and implement a written Hazard
Communication Program and provide Safety Data Sheets, training, and
labeling. 60 The OSHA website also highlights hazard communication
requirements as key to preventing workers from injuring themselves
with harmful chemicals. 161 These regulations were last amended in
2013 and currently do not mandate that hazard labels be in any
language other than English, 62 although OSHA guidance stresses that if
employees receive job instructions in a language other than English, the

156 Modern Cont'l Const. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 305

F.3d 43, 52 (1st Cir. 2002).
157 29 C.F.R. § 1910.145(f)(4)(iv) (2021).
158 29 C.F.R. § 1910.266(i)(9) (2021).
e.g., OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., TRAINING REQUIREMENTS IN OSHA
(collecting
(2015), https://www.osha.gov/Publications/osha2254.pdf
training requirements across dozens of OSHA rules and showing that few of the rules
include requirements that training occur in a language workers can understand).
160 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(a)(1).
161 Compliance Assistance QuiCk Start, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN.,
https://www.osha.gov/dcsp/complianceassistance/quickstarts/construction/index.h
tml#step2 (last visited Feb. 1, 2020).
162 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(f)(10) (2021) ("The employer shall ensure that workplace
labels or other forms of warning are legible, in English, and prominently displayed on
the container, or readily available in the work area throughout each work shift.
Employers having employees who speak other languages may add the information in
their language to the material presented, as long as the information is presented in
English as well.").
159 See,
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training and information conveyed under the Hazard Community
Standard must also be in the worker's language.1 63
OSHA also has several training regulations to address dangers in
the construction industry, but few of these expressly require training to
take place in a language the worker can comprehend. For example,
OSHA requires that employers in the construction industry "shall have
each employee who performs work while on a scaffold trained by a
person qualified in the subject matter to recognize the hazards
associated with the type of scaffold being used and to understand the
procedures to control or minimize those hazards." 164 This regulation
does not require this training to take place in a language that the
employee can understand, however. Falls are another common cause of
death in the construction industry, and OSHA requires employers to
provide a training program for "each employee who might be exposed
to fall hazards,"1 65 though this regulation does not impose any languagebased training requirements.1 66
In sum, OSHA's training requirements span many industries and
address numerous jobsite risks. But few of these regulations expressly
require employers to train their employees in a language that they can
understand. Indeed, these requirements do not even require training in
Spanish despite the prevalence of Spanish-speaking workers in highrisk trades.
B. Assessing OSHA's Policies
The empirical results developed in this Article can shed light on the
past efficacy of OSHA's policies to improve immigrant welfare in the
workplace. Before assessing OSHA's programs, however, we highlight
several key contributions to the literature. First, we constructed fatality
rates using some of the most recent 2015 CFOI data to show that
immigrant workers, particularly those from Mexico, continued to have
a higher fatality rate than native-born workers. Second, we are the first
researchers to use the NIS to provide a longitudinal assessment of
whether new immigrants to the United States transition into safer jobs
over time. We showed that even though some immigrants certainly
improved in terms of their job safety between 2003 and 2007, a
substantial portion of immigrant workers either remained in high-risk

163

Frequently Asked Questions: Hazard Communication (HAZCOM), OCCUPATIONAL
https://www.osha.gov/html/faq-hazcom.html#faq6 (last

SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN,

visited Feb. 1, 2020).

29 C.F.R. § 1926.454(a) (2021).
29 C.F.R. § 1926.503(a)(1) (2021).
166 See id.
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jobs during this time or moved into even more dangerous occupations.
Finally, we used the latest data from the CFOI and the CPS to show that,
unlike native-born workers, immigrant workers did not receive hazard
pay for workplace fatality risk. This phenomenon was particularly
striking for immigrant workers from Mexico. Indeed, though nativeborn workers earned between $375 and $385 in annual compensation
for job risks in 2015, immigrant workers were underpaid by $505, and
immigrants from Mexico were underpaid by $932.167
In conjunction, these results shed light on ways in which OSHA can
implement its policies to improve workplace safety for immigrant
workers. Under the Bush Administration, OSHA began to provide
Spanish-speaking immigrant workers with Spanish-language resources.
OSHA established an 800 number for Spanish-speaking workers and
1 68
created a clearinghouse of Spanish-language safety materials online.
OSHA also engaged in some proactive outreach programs at that time as
well through the Hispanic Worker's Taskforce.1 69 But our results
suggest that more ambitious outreach programs are needed to reduce
immigrant fatality rates relative to those of native-born workers or
enable immigrant workers to receive hazard pay.' 7 0 Table 1 shows that
the native fatality rates, like those for immigrant workers, remained
7 1
This stability
largely unchanged under the Bush Administration.
indicates that opportunities remain for policies to address the fatality
rate gap.
OSHA also engaged in outreach programs with immigrant workers
under the Obama Administration. One notable Obama-era OSHA policy
was the National Action Summit for Latino Worker Health & Safety,
which joined together nearly five hundred labor union leaders,
community organizers, industry members, and government officials to
design programs that would provide immigrant communities with
education, training, and assistance. 7 2 Although programs like this
almost certainly helped reduce immigrant fatalities, even ambitious
conferences do not necessarily translate into policies that substantially
improve immigrant-worker safety. We showed that the fatality rate for
immigrants was higher than U.S.-born workers in 2007 and 2015 and
that immigrants, especially those from Mexico, did not receive hazard

See supra Section
See supra Section
169 Id.
170 See supra Section
171 See supra Section
172 See supra Section
167
168

V.D.
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III.C.
II.C.
VI.A.
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pay for bearing these risks.1 73 Immigrant fatality rates did not improve
relative to those of native-born workers between 2007 and 2015,
indicating that more ambitious policy efforts are needed to improve
immigrant workers' safety at the job site.
C. Policy Proposals
We offer two proposals that OSHA could implement to improve
workplace safety for immigrant workers. First, we recommend that
OSHA, subject to a benefit-cost test, should provide immigrant workers
with safety materials in their native languages whenever the Agency
engages in outreach programs to improve immigrant safety. Prior
research has shown that immigrants lacking English proficiency face
especially high job risks and fail to receive hazard pay relative to native
workers or other immigrant groups.1 74 Communicating risks and safety
precautions in Spanish, or the immigrant's native language, could have
significant returns in terms of workplace safety for immigrant workers
that lack English proficiency.
Thus, our more modest proposal
recommends that OSHA identify which of its outreach programs most
efficiently identifies an immigrant worker's native language so that
OSHA can distribute safety materials in that language.
Our more ambitious proposal recommends that OSHA promulgate
regulations requiring employers of non-English speaking workers to
translate all safety materials-whether those be chemical labels, safety
data sheets, or training manuals-into a language the worker can
comprehend whenever the benefits of doing so exceed the costs. To be
sure, we recognize that OSHA currently has a broad guidance policy that
employer's train employees in a language their employees can
understand along with requirements that mandate multilingual training
in some circumstances-such as the requirement that some safety signs
be posted in a language that workers comprehend, 7 s or that training
programs in the logging industry are conducted in a worker's native
language. 7 6
These multilingual training requirements are not
universal, however. As we note in Section VI.A, risks posed by
hazardous chemicals, along with training related to scaffolding or falls
in the construction industry, do not expressly need to be conveyed in a
language that workers can understand.1 77

173 See supra Section II.C.

174 Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 5, at 768.
17s 29 C.F.R. § 1910.145(f)(4)(iv) (2021).
176 29 C.F.R. § 1910.266(i)(9) (2021).
177 29 C.F.R. § 1926.454(a) (2021); 29 C.F.R. § 1926.503(a)(1) (2021).
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Accordingly, we recommend that OSHA conduct a benefit-cost
analysis to determine when to promulgate regulations mandating that
employers provide multilingual safety and training materials. One
regulation likely to pass a benefit-cost test is mandating that employers
provide training or safety materials in Spanish. Here, the benefits
include lives saved and injuries averted from the Spanish-language
safety materials, while the costs will be primarily driven by compliance
costs for employers. Of course, these regulations can be tailored as
needed to particular industries or occupations that employ a large
portion of Spanish-speaking workers to minimize unnecessary
Next, looking beyond Spanish-language
costs.
compliance
requirements, it is likely that OSHA regulations for other languages
could also pass a benefit-cost test for dangerous occupations that
employ large numbers of non-English and non-Spanish speaker
workers. We accordingly recommend that OSHA investigate which
occupations those may be and promulgate regulations accordingly.
Finally, as a safety valve to minimize compliance costs, we suggest that
OSHA include a provision in its regulations that employers need not hire
workers with whom they cannot communicate. This would ensure that
small employers could comply with OSHA's regulations without putting
immigrant workers at risk.
Overall, our proposed regulatory scheme would encourage
employers to provide training manuals, chemical warnings, and verbal
training in a language that workers can comprehend and act on. By
educating immigrant workers about job risks, these workers are better
able to select jobs that will compensate them for those risks or transition
into safer jobs with lower fatality rates. As a result, immigrant workers
can become safer, and the gap between immigrant and worker fatality
rates can begin to close.
VII. CONCLUSION

Immigrant workers composed between 10 and 15 percent of the
workforce between 2003 and 2015 and make up a significant portion of
workplace fatalities. 178 OSHA is tasked with improving safety for all
workers, including immigrants, and OSHA has undertaken a number of
initiatives directed specifically at immigrant job safety.1 79 But despite
these programs, we show that immigrants still suffer in the workplace
in a number of ways: they have higher average fatality rates than native
workers, remain trapped into dangerous jobs over time, and do not

178 See supra Section III.B.
179 See supra Section VI.A
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receive compensation for job risks. These results have implications for
OSHA.
Though OSHA's programs under the Bush and Obama
Administrations certainly improved workplace safety for many
immigrants, we suggest that OSHA could be doing more. In particular,
given prior research showing the importance of English proficiency in
receiving hazard pay, 180 we recommend that OSHA focus on providing
safety materials to immigrants in the immigrant's native language.
Alternatively, OSHA could take a more aggressive stance and
promulgate regulations mandating that employers also provide training
and safety materials in Spanish when the benefits of doing so exceed the
costs.

180 Hersch and Viscusi, supra note 5, at 768.
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APPENDIX

This Appendix first includes summary statistics for the CPS sample
used to conduct our regression analysis in Appendix Table 1.
Appendix Table 1: CurrentPopulationSurvey Summary Statistics
2015

2007
VARIABLES

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Wage (Dollars/Hour)

16.6

9.9

19.0

11.9

Experience

22

12.2

22.4

12.7

Education

12.5

2.6

12.8

2.7

Age

39.5

12.0

40.19

12.5

Union (Percent)

14.8

35.6

12.8

33.4

Government (Percent)

12.6

33.2

12.2

32.7

Hispanic (Percent)

17.5

38

18.8

39

Immigrants (Percent)

18.9

39.2

18.9

39.1

Mexican Immigrants (Percent)

8.1

27.2

7.5

26.4

Married (Percent)

55.2

49.7

51.1

50

White (Percent)

81.9

38.5

79.1

40.6

Black (Percent)

10.8

31

12.3

32.8

Native American (Percent)

1.2

10.9

1.4

11.8

Asian (Percent)

4.4

20.6

5.6

22.9

